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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Cosaert, Sam; De Rock, Bram; Kerstens, Pieter Jan; Vermeulen, Frederic
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; KU Leuven; University of Copenhagen; KU Leuven
摘要：We propose novel tools for the analysis of individual welfare on the basis of aggregate household demand behavior. The method assumes a collective model of household consumption with the public and private nature of goods specified by the empirical analyst. A main distinguishing feature of our approach is that it builds on a revealed preference characterization of the collective model that is intrinsically nonparametric. We show how to identify individual money metric welfare indices from obse...
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作者：Albrecht, Felix; Kube, Sebastian; Traxler, Christian
作者单位：Philipps University Marburg; University of Bonn; Max Planck Society; Hertie School
摘要：We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a modified strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals. However, the data also rev...
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作者：Abaluck, Jason; Gruber, Jonathan; Swanson, Ashley
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Medicare Part D enrollees face a complicated decision: they dynamically choose prescription drug consumption in each period given difficult-to-find prices and a nonlinear budget set. We use Part D claims data to estimate a flexible model of consumption that accounts for nonlinear prices, dynamic responses, and salience. We use reduced form price responses from a linear regression of consumption on coverage range prices to compare performance under several models of behavior. We find small pric...
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作者：Spenkuch, Jorg L.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：Leading theories of how voters choose between candidates are rooted in two very different paradigms, with starkly different behavioral implications. Exploiting the incentive structure of Germany's electoral system, I develop a novel set of empirical tests that pit the canonical pivotal voter model against alternative accounts according to which individuals derive expressive utility from supporting their most preferred candidate. The results show that neither paradigm can explain the most-salie...
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作者：Garbinti, Bertrand; Goupille-Lebret, Jonathan; Piketty, Thomas
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; European Central Bank; Bank of France; INSEAD Business School; Paris School of Economics; Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper presents Distributional National Accounts (DINA) for France. That is, we combine national accounts, tax and survey data in a comprehensive and consistent manner to build homogenous annual series on the distribution of national income by percentiles over the 1900-2014 period, with detailed breakdown by age, gender and income categories over the 1970-2014 period. Our DINA-based estimates allow for a much richer analysis of the long-run pattern found in previous tax-based series, i.e. ...
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作者：Beath, A.; BenYishay, A.; d'Adda, G.; Grosjean, P.; Weber, R. A.
作者单位：The World Bank; William & Mary; Polytechnic University of Milan; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Zurich
摘要：External financing of local public goods can potentially create 'political resource curses' by reducing citizen oversight, exacerbating elite capture, and producing policy outcomes that are sub-optimal for the general population. This paper experimentally tests a novel mechanism that seeks to mitigate elite capture of local development projects. Control communities are provided with block grants to fund local public goods, while households in treatment communities are provided with vouchers th...
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作者：Rupert, Peter; Zanella, Giulio
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Bologna
摘要：Working-age grandparents supply large amounts of child care, an observation that raises the question of how having grandchildren affects grandparents' own labor supply. Exploiting the unique genealogical design of the PSID and the random variation in the timing when the parents of first-born boys and girls become grandparents, we estimate a structural labor supply model and find a negative effect on employed grandmother's hours of work of about 30% that is concentrated near the bottom of the h...
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作者：Berry, Christopher R.; Fowler, Anthony
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Congressional committees play a central role in policymaking, and the members of the most important committees are thought to be particularly powerful, but committee chairs have received less scholarly attention. We study the effects of congressional committee positions on legislative influence-analyzing legislative effectiveness, campaign contributions, and the implied value of being lobbied-and utilizing a within-member design that allows us to distinguish the effects of committee positions ...
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作者：Cilliers, Jacobus; Kasirye, Ibrahim; Leayer, Clare; Serneels, Pieter; Zeitlin, Andrew
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of East Anglia; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：To achieve the twin objectives of incentivizing agent performance and providing information for planning purposes, public sector organizations often rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to verify. Received wisdom has it that attaching financial incentives to these reports will result in collusion, and undermine both objectives. Simple bargaining logic, however, suggests the reverse: pay for locally monitored performance could incentivize desired behavior and improve information. T...
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作者：Bayramoglu, Basak; Finus, Michael; Jacques, Jean-Francois
作者单位：AgroParisTech; INRAE; Universite Paris Saclay; University of Graz; University of Bath; Universite Gustave-Eiffel; Universite Paris-Est-Creteil-Val-de-Marne (UPEC); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa
摘要：We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement. We show the fear that adaptation will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwarranted. Adaptation can lead to larger self-enforcing agreements, associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causes mitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strategic substitutes but complements. We argue that our resul...
