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作者：Feng, Xin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：University of International Business & Economics; National University of Singapore
摘要：Multi-battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life. In this paper, we examine the effort-maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi-battle competitions between two players. The organizer has a fixed prize budget, and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three-battle contest. A full spectrum of contest technologies in the Tullock family is accommodated. We find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology. In p...
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作者：Bellofatto, Antonio Andres; Besfamille, Martin
作者单位：University of Queensland; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation. Regional governments are characterized by their abilities to deliver public goods (administrative capacity) and to raise tax revenues (fiscal capacity). Two regimes are compared on efficiency grounds. Under partial decentralization, regional governments rely on central bailouts to complete local projects in financing needs. Under full decentralization, marginal financing is achieved via local capital taxes. We show that th...
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作者：Jones, John Bailey; Li, Yue
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：Since 1983, Social Security benefits have been subject to income taxation, a provision that can significantly increase the marginal income tax rate for older individuals. To assess the impact of this tax, we construct and calibrate a detailed life-cycle model of labor supply, saving, and Social Security claiming. We find that in a long run stationary environment, replacing the taxation of Social Security benefits with a revenue-equivalent change in the payroll tax would increase labor supply, ...
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作者：Booth, Alison L.; Cardona-Sosa, Lina; Nolen, Patrick
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Essex
摘要：We examine the effect of single-sex classes on the educational attainment of students within a coeducational university. Before students arrived on campus, we randomly assigned them to all-female, all-male, and coed classes, and thereby avoid the selection issues present in earlier studies on single-sex education of students in primary and secondary school. We find that 1 h a week of single-sex classes benefits women: females score a quarter of standard deviation better overall and are 7.7% mo...
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作者：Vossler, Christian A.; Holladay, J. Scott
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要：To date, much of the theoretical work on the incentive properties of contingent valuation surveys has focused on the oft-recommended single binary choice (SBC), referendum format. This work has identified conditions under which an SBC elicitation is incentive compatible, and empirical evidence lends support to the predictive power of the theory. Nevertheless, researchers and practitioners commonly use alternative elicitation formats, and defend their design choices based on efficiency and othe...
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作者：Auerbach, Alan; Kueng, Lorenz; Lee, Ronald; Yatsynovich, Yury
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Northwestern University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：Even with well-developed capital markets, there is no private market mechanism for trading between current and future generations. This generates a potential role for public old-age pension systems to spread economic and demographic shocks among different generations. This paper evaluates how different systems smooth and propagate shocks to productivity, fertility, mortality and migration in a realistic OLG model. We use reductions in the variance of wealth equivalents to measure performance, ...
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作者：Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently. We identify a so-called Reform Dilemma, which manifests itself in two variants. From a static perspective, low-reform-ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized, who the...
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作者：Friedrichsen, Jana; Koenig, Tobias; Schmacker, Renke
作者单位：Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Humboldt University of Berlin; Free University of Berlin
摘要：Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we ...
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作者：Janeba, Eckhard; Todtenhaupt, Maximilian
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); University of Munich
摘要：This paper explores the implications of high indebtedness for strategic tax setting when capital markets are integrated. When public borrowing is constrained due to sovereign default or by a binding fiscal rule, a rise in a country's initial debt level lowers investment in public infrastructure and makes tax setting more aggressive in that jurisdiction, while the opposite occurs elsewhere. On net a jurisdiction with higher initial debt becomes a less attractive location. Our analysis is inspir...
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作者：Paetzel, Fabian; Sausgruber, Rupert
作者单位：Helmut Schmidt University; Helmut Schmidt University; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：We study the role of performance differences in a task requiring cognitive effort on in-group bias. We show that the in-group bias is strong in groups consisting of high-performing members, and it is weak in low-performing groups. This holds although high-performing subjects exhibit no in-group bias as members of minimal groups, whereas low-performing subjects strongly do. We also observe instances of low-performing subjects punishing the in-group favoritism of low-performing peers. The same d...
