Cooperation and norm enforcement - The individual-level perspective

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Albrecht, Felix; Kube, Sebastian; Traxler, Christian
• 署名单位: Philipps University Marburg; University of Bonn; Max Planck Society; Hertie School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-16
• 关键词: Strategy-method; Punishment patterns; Type classification; Conditional cooperation; Public-goods game; laboratory experiment

摘要

We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a modified strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals. However, the data also reveal a sizable share of free riders that punish pro-socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment. Analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment, we show that pro-social punishers are important for achieving cooperation. Incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between- and within-group variation in cooperation. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.