Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bayramoglu, Basak; Finus, Michael; Jacques, Jean-Francois
• 署名单位: AgroParisTech; INRAE; Universite Paris Saclay; University of Graz; University of Bath; Universite Gustave-Eiffel; Universite Paris-Est-Creteil-Val-de-Marne (UPEC); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 101-113
• 关键词: climate change; Mitigation-adaptation game; Public good agreements; Strategic substitutes versus complements

摘要

We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement. We show the fear that adaptation will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwarranted. Adaptation can lead to larger self-enforcing agreements, associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causes mitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strategic substitutes but complements. We argue that our results extend to many public goods. The well-known problem of easy riding may turn into easy matching if the marginal utility of public good consumption is strongly influenced by private consumption. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.