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作者：Kellner, Christian; Reinstein, David; Riener, Gerhard
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of Exeter; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：Should fundraisers ask a banker to donate if he earns a bonus or wait and ask after the bonus is known? Standard EU theory predicts that these approaches are equivalent; loss-aversion and signaling models predict a larger commitment before the bonus is known; theories of affect predict the reverse. In five experiments incorporating lab and field elements (N=1363), we solicited charitable donations from small lottery winnings, varying the conditionality of donations between participants. Poolin...
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作者：Buettner, Thiess; Erbe, Katharina; Grimm, Veronika
作者单位：University of Erlangen Nuremberg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This paper examines tax planning of married couples under separate taxation. It shows that concerns about the intra-household income distribution prevent couples from minimizing tax payments. The empirical analysis exploits a specific feature of the German tax system, which allows married couples to save taxes by deviating from the default symmetric payroll-tax treatment and assigning favorable tax treatment to the primary earner and unfavorable tax treatment to the secondary earner. Based on ...
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作者：DeBacker, Jason; Heim, Bradley T.; Ramnath, Shanthi P.; Ross, Justin M.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：In 2012, Kansas undertook a large-scale tax reform that excluded pass-through business income from individual taxation. In theory, these changes enhance the incentives to undertake more real economic activity, such as new business formation or expansion of existing businesses. The reform also increased the incentive to avoid taxation by recharacterizing income sources. This paper provides evidence of these effects using federal administrative income tax data spanning 2010-2014. Several finding...
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作者：Kim, Young-Chul; Loury, Glenn C.
作者单位：Sogang University; Brown University
摘要：We extend a model of 'stereotyping' by allowing agents to exert control over their perceived identities. The logic of individuals' identity choices induces a positive selection of the more talented individuals into a group with a superior reputation. Thus, the inequality deriving from the stereotyping of endogenously constructed groups can be greater than the inequality that can emerge when perceived identity is not malleable. Moreover, when identity manipulation is sufficiently easier to unde...
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作者：Clemens, Jeffrey; Wither, Michael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We estimate the minimum wage's effects on low-skilled individuals' employment and income trajectories following the Great Recession. Our approach exploits two dimensions of the data we analyze. First, we compare individuals in states that were fully bound by the 2007 to 2009 increases in the federal minimum wage to individuals in states that were not. Second, we use variation in the minimum wage's bite across skill groups to separate our samples into target and within-state control groups. Usi...
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作者：Agrawal, David R.; Mardan, Mohammed
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We develop a tax competition model that allows for the setting of both an origin-based and a destination-based commodity tax rate in the presence of avoidance and evasion. In the presence of evasion, jurisdictions will give cross-border shoppers tax preferential treatment, thus not fully exploiting the potential of destination-based taxation. Moreover, the divergence between origin-based and destination-based taxes is stronger when the incentives for consumers' tax-arbitrage opportunities incr...
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作者：Forand, Jean Guillaume
作者单位：University of Waterloo
摘要：I study a model of elections which links the scale of government activity to civil service rules. Without tenure protections, bureaucrats' career prospects are tied to the electoral prospects of the party that hires them. To avoid wasteful partisan spending, voters only consent to minimal taxation. If bureaucrats are protected by tenure, they have no incentive to favour one party over another, and governments only produce public goods. In turn, voters consent to high taxes. However, because hi...
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作者：Frey, Anderson
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This paper uses Brazil's Balsa Familia to show that redistributive policies that are shielded from the influence of political intermediaries can reduce incumbency advantage for mayors, increase both electoral competition and candidate quality, reduce support for clientelistic parties, and lead incumbents to increase redistributive spending. The paper exploits a nonparametric multivariate regression discontinuity design and employs a novel identification strategy for the variation in program co...
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作者：Maskin, Eric; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：We develop a model of pork-barrel politics in which a government official tries to improve her reelection chances by spending on targeted interest groups. The spending signals that she shares their concerns. We investigate the effect of such pandering on public spending. Pandering increases spending relative to a non-accountable official (one who does not have to run for reelection) if either the official's overall spending propensity is known, or if it is unknown but the effect of spending on...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：We provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers' consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent. Nonetheless, excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss of privacy compared to the social optimum. The main mechanism for this result is information externalities and users' coordination failure in which some users' decision to share their personal information...
