Pandering and pork-barrel politics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maskin, Eric; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.04.005
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 79-93
• 关键词: accountability; Pandering; Deficit bias; redistributive politics; Budget caps

摘要

We develop a model of pork-barrel politics in which a government official tries to improve her reelection chances by spending on targeted interest groups. The spending signals that she shares their concerns. We investigate the effect of such pandering on public spending. Pandering increases spending relative to a non-accountable official (one who does not have to run for reelection) if either the official's overall spending propensity is known, or if it is unknown but the effect of spending on the deficit is opaque to voters. By contrast, an unknown spending propensity may induce the elected official to exhibit fiscal discipline if spending is transparent. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.