Cash transfers, clientelism, and political enfranchisement: Evidence from Brazil

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frey, Anderson
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.05.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1-17
• 关键词: Political economy; clientelism; redistribution; Cash transfers

摘要

This paper uses Brazil's Balsa Familia to show that redistributive policies that are shielded from the influence of political intermediaries can reduce incumbency advantage for mayors, increase both electoral competition and candidate quality, reduce support for clientelistic parties, and lead incumbents to increase redistributive spending. The paper exploits a nonparametric multivariate regression discontinuity design and employs a novel identification strategy for the variation in program coverage. The theory proposes that cash transfers, by reducing the vulnerability of poor voters, make clientelism a less attractive strategy to incumbent mayors. Consequently, incumbents reallocate effort away from the practice into public good distribution. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.