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作者：Bolleyer, Nicole; Smirnova, Valeria; Di Mascio, Fabrizio; Natalini, Alessandro
作者单位：University of Exeter; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Turin; Parthenope University Naples
摘要：The growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation adopted over the last decades makes the systematic examination of its nature and the rationales underpinning regulatory choices an important endeavor. In this paper we introduce conceptualizations and measurements of conflict of interest (COI) regulation directed toward assuring the impartial and unbiased decisionmaking of national parliamentarians. We distinguish the strictness of rules, the nature of enforcement, sanctions, and transp...
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作者：Chalmers, Adam W.
作者单位：University of London; King's College London
摘要：This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policyma...
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作者：Lelieveldt, Herman
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：This article analyzes the impact competition agencies have on the orchestrating role of states in domestic private regulation. I argue that these agencies can significantly affect interactions in the governance triangle through the way they apply a logic of the market to evaluate agreements between firms. The regulatory framework of European Union competition law has increasingly constrained the ability of firms to take into account broader interests when making agreements to foster social obj...
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作者：Nastase, Andreea; Muurmans, Claire
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：This article offers a systematic exploration of why interest groups sign up to the European Union Transparency Register, a non-binding lobby regulation system. We distinguish between instrumental and normative perspectives to explain voluntary compliance, and find that concern for one's reputation represents the most important motivational driver. Based on this, we suggest that the Transparency Register can be understood as a voluntary club sponsored by European institutions. This theoretical ...
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作者：Rinscheid, Adrian; Eberlein, Burkard; Emmenegger, Patrick; Schneider, Volker
作者单位：University of St Gallen; York University - Canada; University of St Gallen; University of Konstanz
摘要：Why do junctures become critical in some cases but not in others? Building on the critical juncture framework and perspectives on the formation and diffusion of beliefs, we develop a theoretically parsimonious and empirically traceable account of divergence in institutional outcomes. By illuminating the role of agency and joint belief shifts we further open the black box of critical junctures. In particular, we develop the argument that the role agents play is conditioned by conflict lines tha...
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作者：Weinkle, Jessica
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Wilmington
摘要：Using historical context and brief case studies of hurricane risk science, this article illustrates the intimate relationship between the insurance industry and scientific researchers largely assumed to be external to the industry. This paper argues that the extent to which the insurance industry directs, funds, and validates the production and use of science for estimating risk is itself a full blown political enterprise that functions to prioritize industry interests in views of hurricane ri...
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作者：Lurie, Guy; Reichman, Amnon; Sagy, Yair
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：To shed a realist light on court administration and the regulation of judges in liberal-democratic countries, we conduct an empirical study of an organ that has attracted little attention: the Director of Courts in Israel - an administrative entity that manages the judiciary. In important respects, the Director may be regarded as a regulator of judges, thus assessment of judicial independence in Israel is incomplete without recognizing its presence. The institution of the Director has undergon...
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作者：Mentovich, Avital; Ben-Porat, Guy; Levy, Natalie; Goff, Phillip A.; Tyler, Tom
作者单位：University of Haifa; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY); Yale University
摘要：Minority groups frequently challenge the legitimacy of legal authorities, particularly the police. Without trust and legitimacy, the police encounter constant conflict and cannot function effectively. While past research has examined minorities' perceptions of the police, national minorities provide an interesting and under-investigated test case because of their inherent identity conflict with the state. The current research examines three factors to explain minority-majority disparities in v...
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作者：Scott, Tyler A.; Ulibarri, Nicola; Scott, Ryan P.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Colorado State University System; Colorado State University Fort Collins
摘要：Regulation increasingly mandates collaborative approaches to increase stakeholder input and streamline approval processes. However, understanding how to maintain stakeholder involvement over the course of a long collaborative process is vital to optimize effectiveness. This paper observes more than 700 stakeholders involved in developing and implementing a dam operating license over 16 years. We use text mining and Bayesian hierarchical modeling to observe meeting attendance and recorded actio...
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作者：Lee, Don S.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：This article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for several political factors. Further evidenc...
