Out of tune or well tempered? How competition agencies direct the orchestrating state
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lelieveldt, Herman
署名单位：
Utrecht University
刊物名称：
REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
1748-5983
DOI：
10.1111/rego.12223
发表日期：
2020
页码：
465-480
关键词：
private-regulation
governance
legitimacy
ACTORS
POLICY
sustainability
authorities
DELEGATION
targets
welfare
摘要：
This article analyzes the impact competition agencies have on the orchestrating role of states in domestic private regulation. I argue that these agencies can significantly affect interactions in the governance triangle through the way they apply a logic of the market to evaluate agreements between firms. The regulatory framework of European Union competition law has increasingly constrained the ability of firms to take into account broader interests when making agreements to foster social objectives. This logic of the market clashes with the ever-increasing emphasis governments place on enabling firms to enter into such agreements. I analyze this tension through a case study of a pact of Dutch retailers to collectively introduce higher animal welfare standards for poultry. Using regulatory network analysis I trace the governance interactions between the governance triangle on the one hand (government, non-governmental organizations, and firms), and the Dutch competition authority,Autoriteit Consument en Markt(ACM) and the European Commission on the other hand. Attempts by the Dutch government to instruct the ACM to be more lenient toward private regulation were blocked twice by the European Commission. As a result, the Dutch government abandoned private regulation as the preferred mode and proposed a bottom-up process that would generate public regulation as a way to avoid conflict with competition policy. I argue that paradoxically enough the intervention of these non-majoritarian competition agencies against the will of the governance triangle has potentially increased the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration processes.
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