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作者：Lopomo, G; Ok, EA
作者单位：Duke University; New York University
摘要：We consider two-person bargaining games with interdependent preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both the ultimatum game and the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are consistent with a number of robust experimental regularities that falsify the standard game-theoretic model. occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and outcomes that come close to the equal split of the pie. In the context of infinite-horizon bargainin...
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作者：de Meza, D; Webb, DC
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Exeter
摘要：This article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk-averse types. Taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients, allowing a strict Pareto gain. This result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing pol...
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作者：Miller, NH; Pazgal, AI
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：In a two-stage differentiated-products oligopoly model. profit-maximizing owners first choose incentive schemes in order to influence their managers' behavior In the second stage, the managers complete either both in prices, both in quantities, or one in price and the other in quantity. If the owners have sufficient power to manipulate their managers' incentives, the equilibrium outcome ir the same regardless of how the firms compete in the second stage. If demand is linens and marginal cost i...
