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作者：Goettler, RL; Shachar, R
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We present an empirical study of spatial competition and a methodology to estimate demand for products with unobservable characteristics. Using panel data, we estimate a discrete-choice model with latent-product attributes and unobserved heterogeneous consumer preferences. Our application of the methodology to the network television industry yields estimates that are consistent with experts' views. Given our estimates, we compute Nash equilibria of a product location game and find that firms' ...
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作者：Lopomo, G; Ok, EA
作者单位：Duke University; New York University
摘要：We consider two-person bargaining games with interdependent preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both the ultimatum game and the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are consistent with a number of robust experimental regularities that falsify the standard game-theoretic model. occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and outcomes that come close to the equal split of the pie. In the context of infinite-horizon bargainin...
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作者：de Meza, D; Webb, DC
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Exeter
摘要：This article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk-averse types. Taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients, allowing a strict Pareto gain. This result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing pol...
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作者：Miller, NH; Pazgal, AI
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：In a two-stage differentiated-products oligopoly model. profit-maximizing owners first choose incentive schemes in order to influence their managers' behavior In the second stage, the managers complete either both in prices, both in quantities, or one in price and the other in quantity. If the owners have sufficient power to manipulate their managers' incentives, the equilibrium outcome ir the same regardless of how the firms compete in the second stage. If demand is linens and marginal cost i...
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作者：Klein, PG
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：This article challenges the conventional wisdom that the 1960s conglomerates were inefficient. I offer valuation results consistent with recent event-study evidence that markets typically rewarded diversifying acquisitions. Using new data, 1 compute industry-adjusted valuation, profitability, leverage, and investment ratios for 36 large, acquisitive conglomerates from 1966 to 1974. During the early 1970s, the conglomerates were less valuable and less profitable than stand-alone firms, favoring...
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作者：Athey, S; Schmutzler, A
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Zurich
摘要：We analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment. Special cases include incremental investment, parent races, learning by doing, and network externalities, We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments, To this end, we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes, which applies to our investment game. Finally, we highlight plausible countervailing eff...
