The equivalence of price and quantity competition with delegation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miller, NH; Pazgal, AI
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2696410
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 284-301
• 关键词: uncertainty; equilibria; incentives; oligopoly; duopoly

摘要

In a two-stage differentiated-products oligopoly model. profit-maximizing owners first choose incentive schemes in order to influence their managers' behavior In the second stage, the managers complete either both in prices, both in quantities, or one in price and the other in quantity. If the owners have sufficient power to manipulate their managers' incentives, the equilibrium outcome ir the same regardless of how the firms compete in the second stage. If demand is linens and marginal cost is constant basing the manager's objective function an a linear combination of the firm's profit and its rival's profit is sufficient for the equivalence result.