Bargaining, interdependence, and the rationality of fair division

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lopomo, G; Ok, EA
• 署名单位: Duke University; New York University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2696409
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 263-283
• 关键词: ultimatum; games; delay; MODEL

摘要

We consider two-person bargaining games with interdependent preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both the ultimatum game and the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are consistent with a number of robust experimental regularities that falsify the standard game-theoretic model. occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and outcomes that come close to the equal split of the pie. In the context of infinite-horizon bargaining, the implications of the model pertaining to fair outcomes are even stronger: In particular the Cease property in our case generates almost 50-50 splits of the pie, almost immediately, The present approach thus provides a positive theory for the frequently encountered phenomenon of the 50-50 division of the gains from trade.