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作者：Laffont, JJ; Marcus, S; Rey, P; Tirole, J
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access charge allocates communication costs between websites and consumers and affects the volume of traffic. We analyze the impact of the access charge on competitive strategies in an unregulated retail environment. In a remarkably broad range of environments, operators set prices for their customers as if their customers' traffic were entirely off-net. We then compa...
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作者：Gutiérrez, M
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I present a principal-agent model where the shareholders (principal) can take legal action against the director (agent). The court's decision provides a verifiable but costly and imperfect signal on the director's fulfilment of his fiduciary duties. The director's remuneration can be made contingent not only on performance but also upon the court's decision. 1 show that when damage awards are high enough, the widespread use of liability insurance and limited-liability provisions that is observ...
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作者：Crémer, J
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
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作者：Tay, A
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry, where the choices of Medicare patients are unaffected by prices. Unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness, this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market. I estimate a random-coefficients discrete-choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both dista...
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作者：Levin, D; Peck, J
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider general continuous distributions,for the fixed cost, and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. Comparative-statics results are derived. As the time between rounds approaches zero, all of the acti...
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作者：Faure-Grimaud, A; Martimort, D
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：Regulatory independence from political control enlarges the collusive opportunities between regulators and interest groups. This is costly for current politicians because deterring capture becomes harder. However, independence also constrains future governments. Whenever future and current governments have different preferences, independence creates a stabilization effect as both majorities find it more difficult to move policies toward their ideal points. Since deterring collusion links curre...
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作者：Gaynor, M; Vogt, WB
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the hospital industry in California, then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger. California hospitals in 1995 faced an average price elasticity of demand of -4.85. Not-for-profit hospitals faced less elastic demand and acted as if they have lower marginal costs. Their prices were lower than t...
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作者：Vera-Hernández, M
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditi...
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作者：Elfenbein, DW; Lerner, J
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine the structure of more than 100 alliances by Internet portals and other firms between 1995 to 1999 from a contract-theory perspective. Models of incomplete contracts frequently invoke unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts, and the cost of enforcing contracts in justifying the assumption of incompleteness. The setting in which Internet portals formed alliances was rife with these sorts of transaction costs. We argue that these alliances can be viewed as incomplete co...
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作者：Crocker, KJ; Moran, JR
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Syracuse University
摘要：Impediments to worker mobility serve to mitigate the attrition of healthy individuals from employer-sponsored insurance pools, thereby creating a de facto commitment mechanism that allows for more complete insurance of health risks than would be possible in the absence of such frictions.. Using data on health insurance contracts obtained from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, we find that the quantity of insurance provided is positively related to the degree of worker commitment. T...
