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作者：Bai, CE; Tao, ZG; Wu, CQ
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Peking University
摘要：We present a model of team production motivated by the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint-venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the property rights and the transaction cost theories of the firm, and it emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue sharing and control arrangements offers strong support to our model motivated by property rights theor...
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作者：Novaes, W; Zingales, L
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labelled bureaucratic and inefficient. We argue that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a multilayer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of managerial turnover; and it estab...
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作者：Malcomson, JM
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too-weak incentives to investigate cost further when the expected cost of treatment is greater than the benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treatment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers) provides too-strong incentives when the expected cost is less than the benefit. Giving patients the choice between a gatekeeper with a...
