Bureaucracy as a mechanism to generate information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Novaes, W; Zingales, L
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/1593690
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 245-259
• 关键词: design; ORGANIZATIONS; CONTRACTS

摘要

Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labelled bureaucratic and inefficient. We argue that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a multilayer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of managerial turnover; and it establishes a link between bureaucracy, incentive schemes, and leverage in a cross-section of firms.