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作者：Leslie, P
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A common thread in the theory literature on price discrimination has been the ambiguous welfare effects for consumers and the rise in profit for firms, relative to uniform pricing. In this study I resolve the ambiguity for consumers and quantify the benefit for a firm. I describe a model of price discrimination that includes both second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Using data from a Broadway, play, I estimate the structural model and conduct various experiments to investigate ...
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作者：Burguet, R; Che, YK
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes. With complete information and no corruption, the efficient firm will win the contract for sure. If the agent is corrupt and has large manipulation power however bribery makes it costly for the efficient firm to secure a sure win, so in equilibrium the efficient firm loses the contract with positive probability The optimal scoring rule for th...
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作者：Bai, CE; Tao, ZG; Wu, CQ
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Peking University
摘要：We present a model of team production motivated by the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint-venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the property rights and the transaction cost theories of the firm, and it emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue sharing and control arrangements offers strong support to our model motivated by property rights theor...
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作者：Novaes, W; Zingales, L
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labelled bureaucratic and inefficient. We argue that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a multilayer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of managerial turnover; and it estab...
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作者：Cespa, G
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：I analyze a multi-asset market under two trading mechanisms. In the first (the unrestricted system), traders' demand for each asset depends on all equilibrium prices, and prices reflect the information contained in all order flows; in the second (the restricted system), traders' demand depends on the traded asset price, and prices reflect single order flow information. I show that informed traders' use of multidimensional private information depends on the number of prices they observe and on ...
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作者：Anton, JJ; Yao, DA
作者单位：Duke University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary investment). When property rights offer only limited protection, the value of the disclosure is offset by the increased threat of imitation. Our model incorporates three,features critical to this setting: innovation creates asymmetric information, innovation often has only limited legal protection, and disclosure,facilitates imitation. Imitation depends on inf...
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作者：González, P
作者单位：Laval University
摘要：This article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information (Bayesian) environment. An agent faces a hold-up situation while making a cost-reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal. To prevent the hold-up, the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract. The informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the invest...
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作者：Kalnins, A; Lafontaine, F
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We use data on all the new restaurants opened in Texas between 1980 and 1995 by seven of the largest nationally franchised fast-food chains to examine empirically the extent of multi-unit ownership in franchised chains and the way in which franchisors allocate the ownership of units among franchisees. We find that individual franchisees are much more likely to be assigned the ownership of a particular new unit the closer their existing units are geographically to the new unit. Further, given d...
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作者：Van Zandt, T
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：As the costs of generating and transmitting information fall, the main bottlenecks in communication are becoming the human receivers, who are overloaded with information. For networks of targeted communication, I discuss the meaning of information overload, provide a theoretical treatment as the outcome of strategic interaction between senders, and examine mechanisms for allocating the attention of receivers. Such mechanisms increase the cost of sending messages and thereby shift the task of s...
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作者：Daughety, AF; Reinganum, JF
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses have been used to address a repeat player's time-inconsistency problem in. international trade, durable-goods monopoly pricing, franchise contracting, and settlement bargaining. We argue that a nonrepeat player (an early-bargaining plaint) can use an MFN to profitably modify the subsequent bargaining game between the defendant and a later-bargaining plaintiff. If an MFN is triggered (which. can happen in equilibrium), the early plaintiff receives an additional...
