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作者：Leslie, P
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A common thread in the theory literature on price discrimination has been the ambiguous welfare effects for consumers and the rise in profit for firms, relative to uniform pricing. In this study I resolve the ambiguity for consumers and quantify the benefit for a firm. I describe a model of price discrimination that includes both second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Using data from a Broadway, play, I estimate the structural model and conduct various experiments to investigate ...
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作者：González, P
作者单位：Laval University
摘要：This article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information (Bayesian) environment. An agent faces a hold-up situation while making a cost-reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal. To prevent the hold-up, the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract. The informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the invest...
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作者：Van Zandt, T
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：As the costs of generating and transmitting information fall, the main bottlenecks in communication are becoming the human receivers, who are overloaded with information. For networks of targeted communication, I discuss the meaning of information overload, provide a theoretical treatment as the outcome of strategic interaction between senders, and examine mechanisms for allocating the attention of receivers. Such mechanisms increase the cost of sending messages and thereby shift the task of s...
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作者：Daughety, AF; Reinganum, JF
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses have been used to address a repeat player's time-inconsistency problem in. international trade, durable-goods monopoly pricing, franchise contracting, and settlement bargaining. We argue that a nonrepeat player (an early-bargaining plaint) can use an MFN to profitably modify the subsequent bargaining game between the defendant and a later-bargaining plaintiff. If an MFN is triggered (which. can happen in equilibrium), the early plaintiff receives an additional...
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作者：Arya, A; Mittendorf, B
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yale University
摘要：We show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions. Roughly stated, the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in. lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions. A retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms. As a consequenc...
