Investment and screening under asymmetric endogenous information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: González, P
• 署名单位: Laval University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/1593705
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 502-519
• 关键词: hold-up problem; RENEGOTIATION; CONTRACTS; DESIGN

摘要

This article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information (Bayesian) environment. An agent faces a hold-up situation while making a cost-reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal. To prevent the hold-up, the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract. The informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment. For a large class of cost functions, the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a Power distribution.