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作者：Schmitz, PW
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I discuss the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more effective. Should one agent be in control in both stages (integration), or should different agents be in charge of the two actions (separation)? Both modes of organization can be explained on the basis of incentive conside...
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作者：Busse, M; Rysman, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University
摘要：We examine the effect of competition on second-degree price discrimination in display advertising in Yellow Pages directories. Our main empirical finding is that while competition is associated with lower prices, the association is not proportional along the range of product offerings. Instead, directories that face more competitors offer price schedules that display a greater degree of curvature than directories facing less competition. This means that purchasers of the largest ads pay less p...
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作者：Dessí, R
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：I examine optimal financial contracts between entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries (venture capitalists), and other investors that allocate both cash flow rights and control rights to (i) motivate the venture capitalist to efficiently monitor the entrepreneur, (ii) ensure that the efficient decision is made at the interim stage concerning project continuation and refinancing, and (iii) deter collusion between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist at the expense of the other investors....
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作者：Levy, G
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evalu...
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作者：Kim, J; Marschke, G
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：We develop and test a model of the patenting and R&D decisions of all innovating firm whose scientist-employees sometimes quit to join or start a rival. In our model, the innovating firm patents to protect itself from its employees. We show theoretically that the risk of a scientist's departure reduces the firm's R&D expenditures and raises its propensity to patent an innovation. We find evidence from firm-level panel data that is consistent with this latter result. Our results suggest that sc...
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作者：Adner, R; Zemsky, P
摘要：We formalize the phenomenon of disruptive technologies that initially serve isolated market niches and, as they mature, alter industry boundaries by displacing established technologies from mainstream segments. Using a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation, we show how the threat of disruption depends on rates of technological advance, how many firms use each technology, relative market segment sizes, and firms' ability to price discriminate. We characterize the effect of disruption...
