-
作者：Ariely, Dan; Ockenfels, Axel; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Cologne; Harvard University
摘要：A great deal of late bidding has been observed on eBay, which employs a second price auction with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed oil Amazon, which can only end when ten minutes have passed without a bid. In controlled experiments, we find that the difference in the ending rules is sufficient by itself to produce the differences in late bidding observed in the field data. The data also allow us to examine bid amounts in relation to private values, and how behavior is...
-
作者：Hall, BH; Jaffe, A; Trajtenberg, M
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Brandeis University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We explore the usefulness of patent citations as a measure of the importance of a firm's patents, as indicated by the stock market valuation of the firm's intangible stock of knowledge. Using patents and citations for 1963-1995, we estimate Tobin's q equations on the ratios of R&D to assets stocks, patents to R&D, and citations to patents. We find that each ratio significantly affects market value, with an extra citation per patent boosting market value by 3%. Further findings indicate that un...
-
作者：Luelfesmann, Christoph
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：I investigate a model in which two parties A and B invest sequentially in a joint project (an asset). Investments and the asset value are nonverifiable, and A is wealth-constrained so that an initial outlay must be financed by either an agent, B (insider financing), or an external investor, a bank C (outsider financing). I show that an option contract in combination with a loan arrangement facilitates first-best investments and any arbitrary distribution of surplus if renegotiation is infeasib...
-
作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing modes, namely relationship financing, where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable, and arm's length financing, where it is unobservable. We find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes. The rate at which funding is released becom...
-
作者：O'Brien, DP; Shaffer, G
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We examine the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between differentiated upstream firms in an intermediate-goods market served by a downstream monopolist. If the merged firm can bundle, transfer pricing is efficient before and after the merger. Absent cost efficiencies, consumer and total welfare do not change. If the merged firm cannot bundle and its bargaining power is sufficiently high, transfer pricing is inefficient after the merger. Absent cost efficiencies, welfare typicall...
-
作者：Schmitz, PW
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I discuss the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more effective. Should one agent be in control in both stages (integration), or should different agents be in charge of the two actions (separation)? Both modes of organization can be explained on the basis of incentive conside...
-
作者：Busse, M; Rysman, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University
摘要：We examine the effect of competition on second-degree price discrimination in display advertising in Yellow Pages directories. Our main empirical finding is that while competition is associated with lower prices, the association is not proportional along the range of product offerings. Instead, directories that face more competitors offer price schedules that display a greater degree of curvature than directories facing less competition. This means that purchasers of the largest ads pay less p...
-
作者：Cestone, G; Fumagalli, C
作者单位：University of Salerno; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm more (less) vulnerable to entry...
-
作者：Chen, KP; Chu, CYC
作者单位：National Taiwan University
摘要：We offer a formal model of corporate income tax evasion. While individual tax evasion is essentially a portfolio-selection problem, corporate income tax evasion is much more complicated. When the owner of a firm decides to evade taxes, not only does she risk being detected by the tax authorities, more importantly, the optimal compensation scheme offered to the employees will also be altered. Specifically, due to the illegal nature of tax evasion, the contract offered to the manager is necessar...
-
作者：Gonzalez, Xulia; Jaumandreu, Jordi; Pazo, Consuelo
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We explore the effects of subsidies by means of a model of firms' decisions about performing R&D when some government support can be expected. We estimate it with data on about 2,000 performing and nonperforming Spanish manufacturing firms. We compute the subsidies required to induce R&D spending, we detect the firms that would cease to perform R&D without subsidies, and assess the change in the privately financed effort. Results suggest that subsidies stimulate R&D and some firms would stop p...
