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作者：Arlen, J; MacLeod, WB
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University
摘要：We examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for negligence when expected accident costs depend on both the agent's level of expertise and the principal's level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physician and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. Under current law, physicians generally are considered independent contractors and hence MCOs are not liable for negligent acts by physicians. We find that the practice of reviewing the m...
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作者：Dessí, R
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：I examine optimal financial contracts between entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries (venture capitalists), and other investors that allocate both cash flow rights and control rights to (i) motivate the venture capitalist to efficiently monitor the entrepreneur, (ii) ensure that the efficient decision is made at the interim stage concerning project continuation and refinancing, and (iii) deter collusion between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist at the expense of the other investors....
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作者：Lyon, TP; Mayo, JW
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Georgetown University
摘要：Large sunk costs and incomplete regulatory contracts in public utilities create the Possibility of opportunistic behavior by either regulators or regulated firms. We present an empirical methodology for identifying opportunism within a regulated setting, and apply it to the large-scale cost disallowances levied by state regulators on electric utilities during the 1980s. Examining the investment propensity of all firms-both those that faced cost disallowances and those that did not-within parti...
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作者：Lafontaine, F; Shaw, KL
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Franchisors simultaneously operate outlets under two distinct incentive schemes: franchising and company ownership. Using an extensive panel dataset, we show that experienced franchisors maintain a stable level of corporate ownership over time. However, the targeted rate of company ownership varies considerably across firms. We show that franchisors with high brand name value, measured by major media expenditures and other proxies, have high rates of company ownership. We argue that franchisor...
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作者：Mialon, Hugo M.
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：The Fifth Amendment's due process clause requires the prosecution to share evidence with the defense, and the right to silence that it guarantees blocks the jury from drawing an adverse inference from a defendant's silence during trial. I examine the effect of the right to silence and the disclosure requirement on conviction rates and social welfare in an economic model of criminal trials. Many policy-relevant results emerge. The right to silence can improve welfare only if juries discriminate...
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作者：Toivanen, O; Waterson, M
作者单位：University of Helsinki; University of Warwick
摘要：We study the effects of market structure on entry using data from the U.K.. fast food (counterservice burger) industry over the years 1991-1995, for which the market can be characterized as a duopoly. We use both reduced-form estimations and a structural model, controlling for market-specific time-invariant unobservables. For both firms, we find that market structure matters greatly. Specifically, rival presence increases the probability of entry by increasing expected market size, whereas var...
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作者：Levy, G
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evalu...
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作者：de Fontenay, CC; Gans, JS
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze vertical integration to compare outcomes under upstream competition and monopoly. This is done in a model based on the property rights approach to firm boundaries and where multilateral negotiations are modelled using a fully specified, noncooperative bargaining game. We demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstre...
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作者：Shavell, S
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities. Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk. However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities. Liability insurance requirements tend to improve incentives to reduce risk when insurers can o...
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作者：Kim, J; Marschke, G
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：We develop and test a model of the patenting and R&D decisions of all innovating firm whose scientist-employees sometimes quit to join or start a rival. In our model, the innovating firm patents to protect itself from its employees. We show theoretically that the risk of a scientist's departure reduces the firm's R&D expenditures and raises its propensity to patent an innovation. We find evidence from firm-level panel data that is consistent with this latter result. Our results suggest that sc...
