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作者：Beresteanu, Arie
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Using data on local exchange carriers (LECs), I estimate the total cost function of LECs operating between 1988 and 1995. First, I show that cost complementarities can be nonparametrically identified in many situations where economies of scope and subadditivity-the focus of previous empirical research-cannot be identified. Next, I implement a feasible nonparametric estimation model restricting the cost function to satisfy properties required by economic theory. The results support the assumpti...
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作者：Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew; Viswanathan, S.
作者单位：Columbia University; Duke University
摘要：In many auctions, bidders do not have enough cash to pay their bid. If bidders have asymmetric cash positions and independent private values, then auctions will be inefficient. However, what happens if bidders have access to financial markets? We characterize efficient auctions and show that in an efficient auction the information rent that a bidder earns depends generally on both his valuation and his cash position. In contrast, a competitive capital market that is efficient must have informa...
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作者：Adner, R; Zemsky, P
摘要：We formalize the phenomenon of disruptive technologies that initially serve isolated market niches and, as they mature, alter industry boundaries by displacing established technologies from mainstream segments. Using a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation, we show how the threat of disruption depends on rates of technological advance, how many firms use each technology, relative market segment sizes, and firms' ability to price discriminate. We characterize the effect of disruption...
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作者：Thomadsen, Raphael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：I analyze how ownership structure and market geography jointly influence fast food prices. I estimate a model of demand and supply that accounts for the market geography and run counterfactual experiments that demonstrate how mergers affect prices. I find that the impact of mergers can be large, that this impact decreases as the merging outlets are farther apart, that mergers among market leaders generally increase prices more than mergers among weaker firms, and that mergers can increase pric...
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作者：Compte, O; Lambert-Mogiliansky, A; Verdier, T
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe. As firms expect to be paying a bribe, a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated bribe. We show, however, that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firm...
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作者：Borenstein, S; Holland, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Greensboro
摘要：Most customers in electricity markets do not face prices that change frequently to reflect changes in wholesale costs, known as real-time pricing (RTP). We show that not only does time-invariant pricing in competitive markets lead to prices and investment that are not first best, it evenfails to achieve the constrained second-best optimum. Increasing the share of customers on RTP is likely to improve efficiency, though surprisingly it does not necessarily reduce capacity investment, and it is ...
