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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Jullien, Bruno; Salanie, Bernard; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：Columbia University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk, as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard. We show here that the positive correlation property can be extended to general setups: competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public. We test our results on a French dataset. Our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive; they also sugges...
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作者：Klepper, Steven; Thompson, Peter
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We construct a model of industry evolution in which the central force for change is the creation and destruction of submarkets. Firms expand when they are able to exploit new opportunities that arrive in the form of submarkets; they contract and ultimately exit when the submarkets in which they operate are destroyed. This simple framework can transparently explain a wide range of well-known regularities about industry dynamics, most notably the subtle relationships between size, age, growth, a...
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作者：Davis, Peter
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Retail markets are extremely important, but economists have few practical tools for analyzing the way dispersed buyers and sellers affect the properties of markets. I develop an econometric model of retail demand in which products are location specific and consumers have preferences over both geographic proximity and other store and product characteristics. The model uses data on the observed geographic distribution of consumers within a market to (I) help explain observed variation in market ...
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作者：Martimort, David; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We analyze the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf. Governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility, while risk-neutral contractors undertake a nonverifiable operating effort. The design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality, the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government. This feature reduces the agent's marginal incentiv...
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作者：Severinov, Sergei; Deneckere, Raymond
作者单位：Duke University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands, some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences. We show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities. Whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive, there is no exclusion: the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal ...
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作者：Augereau, Angelique; Greenstein, Shane; Rysman, Marc
作者单位：Northwestern University; Columbia University
摘要：56K modems were introduced under two competing incompatible standards. We show the importance of competition between internet service providers in the adoption process. We show that ISPs were less likely to adopt the technology that more competitors adopted. This result is particularly striking given that industry participants expected coordination on one standard or the other. We speculate about the role of ISP differentiation in preventing the market from achieving standardization until a st...
