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作者：Jullien, Bruno; Rey, Patrick
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of devi...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Ma, Ching-to Albert
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Boston University
摘要：We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public-service physicians may refer patients to their private practices. Some doctors in the public system are dedicated, and behave sincerely, but others-the moonlighters-are utility maximizers. Allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare, but equilibrium public-care quality may increase or decrease; if quality increases, moonlighting improves each consumer's expected utility. Unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfa...
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作者：Chiao, Benjamin; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article empirically explores standard-setting organizations' policy choices. Consistent with our earlier theoretical work, we find (i) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (ii) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating r...
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作者：Pagnozzi, Marco
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II
摘要：A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket: a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price. So it can be common knowledge that, in equilibrium, a weak bidder will win the auction and, even without uncertainty about relative valuations, resal...
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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：University of Southern California; Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze a cheap talk game with partial commitment by the principal. We first treat the principal's commitment power as exogenous and then endogenize it in an infinitely repeated game. We characterize optimal decision making for any commitment power and show when it takes the form of threshold delegation-in which case the agent can make any decision below a threshold-and centralization-in which case the agent has no discretion. For small biases, threshold delegation is optimal for any smooth...
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a job-market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low...
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作者：Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Kent State University; Kent State University Kent; Kent State University Salem; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity-constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may set bids th...
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作者：Inderst, Roman; Klein, Manuel
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm....
