A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Araujo, Aloisio; Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1020-1043
• 关键词: Incentives; school

摘要

We develop a job-market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages.