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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Jamison, Julian
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We analyze noncooperative collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where each of the n firms receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period and firms only (and privately) observe whether they have won the unit mass of consumers. No other information is available and no communication is allowed. We prove that there exist equilibria in private strategies approximating first-best profits when firms are sufficiently patient. In particular productive efficiency obtains in...
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作者：Normann, Hans-Theo; Ruffle, Bradley J.; Snyder, Christopher M.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Dartmouth College
摘要：A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that, for buyer-size discounts to emerge in a bargaining model, the total surplus function over which parties bargain must have certain nonlinearities. We test the theory in an experimental setting in which a seller bargains with a number of buyers of different sizes. Nonlinearities in the surplus function are generated by varying the shape of the seller cost function. Consistent with the theory, we find that quantity discounts emerge only in th...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Lewis, Tracy R.
作者单位：Columbia University; Duke University
摘要：We examine breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to encourage bidder participation in takeover contests. Unless bidding costs for the first bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially desirable degree of competition and ensure the efficient allocation of the target to the highest-valued buyer in a takeover auction. In contrast, stock lockups permit the target firm to subsidize entry of a new bidder at the expense of an incumbent bidder Stock lock...
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作者：Marx, Leslie M.; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：Duke University; University of Rochester
摘要：Although up front payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers, little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them. In this article, we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to a common manufacturer We find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts, and in all equilibria, only one retailer buys from the manufacturer These findings support the claims of small m...
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作者：Ozerturk, Saltuk
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：This article analyzes the provision of information acquisition and truthful reporting incentives to a financial analyst who can privately trade on own account. In a binary message and state space, I show that the analyst reward scheme essentially provides him with a portfolio endowment traded in the market. Regardless of the true signal, the analyst issues the report that corresponds to the portfolio endowment with maximum market value, given security prices. The analyst information acquisitio...
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作者：Anderson, Axel; Cabral, Luis M. B.
作者单位：Georgetown University; New York University
摘要：We consider a differential game in which the joint choices of the two players influence the variance, but not the mean, of the one-dimensional state variable. We show that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies (ME) exists and has the property that patient players choose to play it safe when sufficiently ahead and to take risks when sufficiently behind. We also provide a simple condition that implies both players choose risky strategies when neither one is too far ...
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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Markovich, Sarit
作者单位：Harvard University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Can advertising lead to a sustainable competitive advantage? To answer this question, we propose a dynamic model of advertising competition where firms repeatedly advertise, compete in the product market, and make entry as well as exit decisions. Within this dynamic framework, we study two different models of advertising: in the first model, advertising influences the goodwill consumers extend toward a firm (goodwill advertising'), whereas in the second model it influences the share of consume...
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作者：Iizuka, Toshiaki
作者单位：Aoyama Gakuin University
摘要：This article examines the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the markup, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti-hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the markup. However physicians are also sensit...
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作者：Crocker, Keith J.; Slemrod, Joel
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incent...
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作者：Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：I consider whether a privately informed incumbent can use limit pricing and upward distortions in advertising to deter profitable entry. Profitable entry is not deterred when the incumbent is privately informed only about its cost type. Profitable entry may be deterred, however, if the incumbent is privately informed about its cost type and its patience level. An equilibrium foundation is thus provided for the traditional hypothesis that limit pricing and aggressive advertising by an incumbent...
