Collusion with (almost) no information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoerner, Johannes; Jamison, Julian
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 804-822
• 关键词: Repeated games; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; repeated auctions; folk theorem

摘要

We analyze noncooperative collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where each of the n firms receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period and firms only (and privately) observe whether they have won the unit mass of consumers. No other information is available and no communication is allowed. We prove that there exist equilibria in private strategies approximating first-best profits when firms are sufficiently patient. In particular productive efficiency obtains in the limit.