Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marx, Leslie M.; Shaffer, Greg
• 署名单位: Duke University; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 823-843
• 关键词: slotting allowances; countervailing-power; CONTRACTS; incentives; mergers

摘要

Although up front payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers, little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them. In this article, we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to a common manufacturer We find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts, and in all equilibria, only one retailer buys from the manufacturer These findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments.