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作者：Sharma, Rajiv; Stano, Miron; Gehring, Renu
作者单位：Portland State University; Oakland University
摘要：We analyze admission and discharge decisions when hospitals become capacity constrained on high-demand days, and develop a test for discrimination that, under certain circumstances, does not require controls for differences across patient groups. On high-demand days, patients are discharged earlier than expected compared to those discharged on low-demand days. High demand creates no statistically significant differences in hospitals' admission behavior. Thus, hospitals appear to ration capacit...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I apply the notion of a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders' perceptions about their strategic environment, and consequently their bidding behavior. In a private values setting, revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs (justifying the assumption of Nash equilibrium). In contrast, in every symmetric SCE of a symmetric, affiliated, private values model, bidding strate...
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作者：Hossain, Tanjim
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We analyze a dynamic second-price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise. An uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder. This model also provi...
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作者：Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Exeter; University of Haifa
摘要：We study all-pay contests with effort-dependent rewards under incomplete information. A contestant's value to winning depends not only on his type but also on the effort-dependent reward chosen by the designer. We analyze which reward is optimal for the designer when his objective is either total effort or highest effort. We find that under certain conditions the optimal reward may either be negative or even decreasing in effort; however, we find no advantage to having multiple rewards.
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作者：Lach, Saul; Schankerman, Mark
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We show that universities in the United States that provide stronger royalty incentives to faculty scientists generate greater license income, controlling for university characteristics. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the potential endogeneity of royalty shares. Faculty responds to royalties both in the form of cash and research lab support, indicating both pecuniary and intrinsic research motivations. The impact of incentives is larger in private than in public ...
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作者：Holmes, Thomas J.; Mitchell, Matthew F.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Toronto
摘要：This article develops a theory of how capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor interact at the plant level. The theory has implications for the relationship between factor allocation and plant size and the effects of trade and growth on the skill premium. The theory is consistent with certain facts about factor allocation and factor price changes in the 19th and 20th centuries.
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作者：Marino, Anthony M.; Zabojnik, Jan
作者单位：University of Southern California; Queens University - Canada
摘要：Work-related perks, such as corporate jets, nice offices, and so forth, improve the tradeoff between incentives and insurance that determines the optimal incentive contract. We show that (i) such perks may be offered even if their direct consumption benefits are offset by their costs; (ii) they will be offered for free; (iii) agents in more uncertain production environments will receive more perks; (iv) senior executives should receive more perks; and (v) better corporate governance can lead t...
