-
作者：Deneckere, Raymond; Liang, Meng-Yu
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time. We show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria: a Coase Conjecture equilibrium, a monopoly equilibrium, and a reputational equilibrium. When the depreciation rate is low, the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For intermediate values of the depreciation rate, all three equilibrium types coexist. When the depreciation rate is high, the mo...
-
作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Firms communicate product quality to consumers through a variety of channels. Economic models of such communication take two alternative forms when quality is exogenous: (i) disclosure of quality through a credible direct claim; or (ii) signalling of quality via producer actions that influence buyers' beliefs about quality. In general, these two literatures have ignored one another. We argue that firms should be viewed as choosing which means of communication they will employ. We show that int...
-
作者：Raith, Michael
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I examine optimal incentives and performance measurement in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Contracts can be based both on input measures related to the agent's actions and an output measure related to the principal's payoff. Whereas input-based pay minimizes income risk, only output-based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge efficiently. In general, it is optimal to use both k...
-
作者：Sharma, Rajiv; Stano, Miron; Gehring, Renu
作者单位：Portland State University; Oakland University
摘要：We analyze admission and discharge decisions when hospitals become capacity constrained on high-demand days, and develop a test for discrimination that, under certain circumstances, does not require controls for differences across patient groups. On high-demand days, patients are discharged earlier than expected compared to those discharged on low-demand days. High demand creates no statistically significant differences in hospitals' admission behavior. Thus, hospitals appear to ration capacit...
-
作者：Auriol, Emmanuelle; Renault, Regis
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher-status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relatio...
-
作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil; Baliga, Sandeep; Besanko, David
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk, and variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions. We envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real-world accounting practices, including ones that confuse the relevance of variable, fixed, and sunk costs to...
-
作者：Economides, Nicholas; Seim, Katja; Viard, V. Brian
作者单位：New York University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Local telecommunications competition was an important goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. We evaluate the consumer welfare effects of entry into residential local telephone service in New York State using household-level data from September 1999 to March 2003. We address the prevalence of nonlinear tariffs by developing a discrete/continuous demand model that allows for service bundling and unobservable provider quality. We find that the average subscriber to the entrants' services gains ...
-
作者：Biais, Bruno; Perotti, Enrico
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); University of Amsterdam
摘要：We study how early-stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses. Even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension, such as technical feasibility, correspondence to market demand, legality, or patentability. To screen good ideas, the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise. Sharing the idea, however, creates the risk that the expert would steal it. Yet, the idea-thief cannot contact any other expert, lest he sho...
-
作者：Caruana, Guillermo; Einav, Liran
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze a dynamic model of quantity competition, where firms continuously adjust their quantity targets, but incur convex adjustment costs when they do so. Quantity targets serve as a partial commitment device and, in equilibrium, follow a hump-shaped pattern. The final equilibrium is more competitive than in the static analog. We then use data on monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers and show a similar empirical hump-shaped dynamic pattern. Taken together, thi...
-
作者：Esponda, Ignacio
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I apply the notion of a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders' perceptions about their strategic environment, and consequently their bidding behavior. In a private values setting, revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs (justifying the assumption of Nash equilibrium). In contrast, in every symmetric SCE of a symmetric, affiliated, private values model, bidding strate...
