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作者：Bourjade, Sylvain; Jullien, Bruno
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Universite de Toulouse; TBS Education; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert's incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the con...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We model the dynamic process wherein two privately informed plaintiffs may file and combine related lawsuits in order to lower trial costs and/or improve the likelihood of winning. The equilibrium resembles a bandwagon: some plaintiff types file early, whereas others wait and only file suit if they observe a previous filing. Finally, some plaintiff types never file and some early filers drop their suits if not joined by another plaintiff. We then consider the effect of allowing preemptive sett...
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作者：Goltsman, Maria
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship-specific investment and renegotiation. In such a setting, a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model, namely that of transmitting information between the parties. The article shows that a partial-disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract. If the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is as...
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作者：Arya, Anil; Mittendorf, Brian
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers' perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, ...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten; Pichler, Paul; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Essex
摘要：This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfa...
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：If consumer valuations change over time, then secondary-market frictions may raise monopoly profits and cause durability to be distorted away from the cost-minimizing level. A monopolist who favors such frictions overinvests in durability, but planned obsolescence instead may be preferred when market frictions exist but a monopolist wishes they did not. Evidence from the book market is presented.
