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作者：Gavazza, Alessandro
作者单位：New York University
摘要：When consumers concentrate their purchases at a single firm, firms that offer more products than their rivals gain market share for all their products. These spillovers induce firms to offer a greater variety of products rather than lower prices, and a concentrated industry with few large firms can arise if spillovers are strong enough. This article presents a simple model that illustrates this mechanism explicitly. The empirical analysis documents strong demand spillovers in the retail segmen...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muehlheusser, Gerd
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Hamburg
摘要：We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone andunder some additional restrictionshump-shaped and U-shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and ...
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作者：Ding, Wei; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Korea University
摘要：The literature on research and development contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present article analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit himself to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare fixed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result...
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作者：Spector, David
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：A firm may induce some customers to sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. This strategy may result in socially inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage and can make counteroffers. In addition, allowing for breach penalty clauses decreases firms incentives to exclude rivals, because such clauses allow a firm to use customers as a conduit for the tra...
