Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spector, David
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00147.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 619-638
• 关键词: naked exclusion; COMPETITION; buyers

摘要

A firm may induce some customers to sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. This strategy may result in socially inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage and can make counteroffers. In addition, allowing for breach penalty clauses decreases firms incentives to exclude rivals, because such clauses allow a firm to use customers as a conduit for the transfer of another firms profits.