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作者：Hermalin, Benjamin E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset's future returns. The potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller's investment prior to trade, nor does he receive any signal of it, nor can he verify it in any way after trade. Despite this severe moral-hazard problem, this article shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability. The outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining p...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Over the last eight centuries, lawyers in common law countries have generally been precluded from buying their clients' cases. Recently, a number of economists and lawyers have argued that sale should be allowed so as to eliminate moral hazard, particularly when contingent fees are used; this argument is based on full-information reasoning. However, if the lawyer has private information about the case value, then compensation demands potentially signal this value when the client can search ove...
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作者：Krishna, R. Vijay; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Duke University
摘要：We study a setting in which a principal contracts with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and privately observes the sequence of cost realizations. We formulate the principal's problem as a dynamic program in which the state variable is the agent's continuation utility, which is naturally interpreted as his equity in the firm. The optimal incentive scheme resembles what is commonly regarded as a sweat equity contract, with all rents...
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The go...
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作者：Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Paer; Philpott, Andrew B.
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Auckland
摘要：We introduce the concept of an offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves in multiunit procurement auctions. We characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge, a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games and also characterize novel mixtures over partly increasin...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm's control system fails, I introduce a measure of earnings quality, based on the notion of integral precision, that has solid theoretical foundations. A trade-off between the frequency and the magnitude of overstatements is shown: overstatements are larger when misreporting is less likely. Overall, the model generates a distribution of earnings announcements similar to its empirical analogue and provides a...
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作者：Rey, Patrick; Whinston, Michael D.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of , who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit-maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to thi...
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I examine how the increasing ability of firms to target their ads influences market outcomes when consumers have access to advertising-avoidance tools. Although firms generally benefit from improved targeting, consumers need not. I also show that there may be too little blocking of ads in equilibrium and consider the role of targeted advertising when niche firms compete against mass-market firms.
