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作者：Ciliberto, Federico; Williams, Jonathan W.
作者单位：University of Virginia; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：We provide empirical evidence that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines using a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modelled as functions of multimarket contact. We find (i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, whereas carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; (ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contac...
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作者：Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. Insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high-risk agents. Second, we identify a trade-off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsid...
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作者：Jeziorski, Przemyslaw
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This article estimates fixed-cost efficiencies from mergers using a dynamic oligopoly model in which mergers and repositioning of products are endogenous. The inference is based on revealed preference approach selecting cost synergies that rationalize observed merger decisions. The estimates can be used to assess the total welfare impact of retrospective and counterfactual mergers. The framework is applied to estimate cost efficiencies after the 1996 deregulation of U.S. radio industry. Within...
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作者：Bajari, Patrick; Dalton, Christina; Hong, Han; Khwaja, Ahmed
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; National Bureau of Economic Research; Wake Forest University; Stanford University; Yale University
摘要：Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care consumption. We propose a two-step semiparametric estimation strategy to identify and estimate a canonical model of asymmetric information in health care markets. With this method, we can estimate a structural model o...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auction...
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作者：Honka, Elisabeth
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：I estimate demand for auto insurance in the presence of two types of market frictions: search and switching costs. I develop an integrated utility-maximizing model in which consumers decide over which and how many companies to search and from which company to purchase. My modelling approach rationalizes observed consideration sets as being the outcomes of consumers' search processes. I find search costs to range from $35 to $170 and average switching costs of $40. Search costs are the most imp...
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作者：Miller, Daniel P.
作者单位：Clemson University
摘要：This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions. I estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in-house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation. I model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation. The results highlight the cos...
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作者：Jin, Ginger Zhe; Lee, Jungmin
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Sogang University
摘要：In this article, we show that a small innovation in inspection technology can make substantial differences in inspection outcomes. For restaurant hygiene inspections, the state of Florida has introduced a handheld electronic device, the portable digital assistant (PDA), which reminds inspectors of about 1,000 potential violations that may be checked for. Using inspection records from July 2003 to June 2009, we find that the adoption of PDA led to 11% more detected violations and subsequently, ...
