Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bajari, Patrick; Dalton, Christina; Hong, Han; Khwaja, Ahmed
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; National Bureau of Economic Research; Wake Forest University; Stanford University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12069
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 747-763
• 关键词: life-cycle; 1st-price auctions; medical-care; insurance; uncertainty; demand; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; MARKETS; welfare

摘要

Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care consumption. We propose a two-step semiparametric estimation strategy to identify and estimate a canonical model of asymmetric information in health care markets. With this method, we can estimate a structural model of demand for health care. We illustrate this method using a claims-level data set with confidential information from a large self-insured employer. We find significant evidence of moral hazard and adverse selection.