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作者：Ciliberto, Federico; Williams, Jonathan W.
作者单位：University of Virginia; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：We provide empirical evidence that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines using a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modelled as functions of multimarket contact. We find (i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, whereas carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; (ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contac...
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作者：Webster, Elizabeth; Jensen, Paul H.; Palangkaraya, Alfons
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：One of the principles enshrined in all international patent treaties is that equal treatment should be provided to inventors regardless of their nationality. Little is known about whether this national treatment principle is upheld in practice. We analyze whether patent examination outcomes at the European and Japanese patent offices vary systematically by inventor nationality and technology area, using a matched sample of 47,947 patent applications. We find that domestic inventors have a high...
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作者：Rauh, Michael T.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We develop a theory of incentives, wages, and employment in the context of team production. A central insight is that specialization and division of labor not only improve productivity but also increase effort and the sensitivity of effort to incentives under moral hazard. We show that employment and incentives are complements for the principal when the positive effects of specialization and division of labor outweigh the increase in risk associated with additional employment and are substitut...
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作者：Levy, Nadav
作者单位：Reichman University
摘要：I consider how different managerial traits affect the authority relation between a principal and his agent. An increase in the principal's domain knowledgewhich enhances his capability to verify the agent's recommendationsleads to an increase in the proportion of the agent's recommendations that are approved, an increase in the agent's initiative, and is unambiguously beneficial to the principal and to the agent. In contrast, an increase in the principal's general ability to explore additional...
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作者：Zabojnik, Jan
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：Firms use subjective performance evaluations to provide employees with both incentives and feedback. This article shows that if an objective measure of performance, however imperfect, is available, subjective evaluations with incentive effects can be sustained even without repeated interaction. Although full efficiency cannot be achieved in general, it is achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers. When the number of workers is ...
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作者：Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Santa Clara University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball effect, which mitigates an efficient agent's ratchet incentive, and a carrot effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control, it is optimal wh...
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作者：Hoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Goethe University Frankfurt; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns, accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profit-maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patt...
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作者：Starc, Amanda
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This article examines the welfare impact of imperfect competition in the Medicare supplement insurance (Medigap) market. Two firms control nearly three fourths of the Medigap market, and premiums exceed claims by over 25%. I find that a low price elasticity and consumers' brand preferences lead firms to engage in substantial marketing and price above cost. Therefore, the strategic behavior of insurers facing relatively inelastic demand is critical in explaining poor market performance. I also ...
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作者：Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. Insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high-risk agents. Second, we identify a trade-off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsid...
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作者：Jeziorski, Przemyslaw
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This article estimates fixed-cost efficiencies from mergers using a dynamic oligopoly model in which mergers and repositioning of products are endogenous. The inference is based on revealed preference approach selecting cost synergies that rationalize observed merger decisions. The estimates can be used to assess the total welfare impact of retrospective and counterfactual mergers. The framework is applied to estimate cost efficiencies after the 1996 deregulation of U.S. radio industry. Within...
