Regulating bidder participation in auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, Vivek; Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12067
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 675-704
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; entry; identification; INFORMATION

摘要

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auctions with free entry for bridge-building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.