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作者：Dardanoni, Valentino; Li Donni, Paolo
作者单位：University of Palermo
摘要：We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs. We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss. After identifying some types which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we derive the key factors defining the demand and cost functions in each market induced by these unobservable types. These are...
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作者：Berry, Steven; Eizenberg, Alon; Waldfogel, Joel
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：A vast theoretical literature explores inefficient market structures in free-entry equilibria, and previous empirical work demonstrated that excessive entry may obtain in local radio markets. We extend that literature by relaxing the assumption that stations are symmetric, allowing for endogenous horizontal and (unobserved) vertical station differentiation. We find that, in most broadcasting formats, a social planner who takes into account the welfare of market participants eliminates 50%-60% ...
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作者：Letina, Igor
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：This article examines the effects of market structure on the variety of research projects undertaken and the amount of duplication of research. A characterization of the equilibrium market portfolio of R&D projects and the socially optimal portfolio is provided. It is shown that a merger decreases the variety of developed projects and decreases the amount of duplication of research. An increase in the intensity of competition among firms leads to an increase in the variety of developed project...
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作者：Boudreau, Kevin J.; Lakhani, Karim R.; Menietti, Michael
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment. The performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities, precisely conforming to theoretical predictions. Most participants respond negatively, whereas the highest-skilled contestants respond positively. In counterfactual simulations, we interp...
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作者：Imhof, Lorens; Kraekel, Matthias
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced. If, at the outset, one agent is stronger than the other, the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down. Handicaps can in this case restore incentives. In practice, competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths. Then, competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down, but handicaps cannot be used. We sh...
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作者：Mayo, John W.; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：Georgetown University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs. A supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value, because once the input is acquired, it is unavailable to rivals. An unfettered auction often ensures the welfare-maximizing allocation of an input increment. However, it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive ...
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作者：Boone, Jan; Schottmuller, Christoph
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Copenhagen
摘要：We analyze optimal procurement mechanisms when firms are specialized. The procurement agency has incomplete information concerning the firms' cost functions and values high quality as well as low price. Lower type firms are cheaper (more expensive) than higher type firms when providing low (high) quality. With specialized firms, distortion is limited and a mass of types earns zero profits. The optimal mechanism can be inefficient: types providing lower second-best welfare win against types pro...
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作者：Chone, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent
摘要：Dominant firms often are unavoidable trading partners. Buyers may consider switching a fraction of their requirements to rival products, but that fraction is highly uncertain in rapidly evolving industries. Nonlinear pricing serves to adjust the competitive pressure placed on rival firms, depending on the joint distribution of the buyer willingness to pay for the rival's good and the share of contestable demand. Concave price-quantity schedules erect barriers to entry. Convex parts in schedule...
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作者：Grassi, Simona; Ma, Ching-to Albert
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Boston University
摘要：Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. How...
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作者：Cowan, Simon
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：When demand functions in different markets are derived from distributions of reservation prices that differ only in their means, conditions exist such that third-degree price discrimination leads to greater total output and greater total welfare. Welfare is higher with discrimination than with a uniform price when demand functions are derived from logistic distributions with different means. Welfare and consumer surplus are higher with discrimination for demands derived from a distribution rel...
