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作者：Hunold, Matthias; Stahl, Konrad
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is profitable when controlling acquisition is not. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, thus delegating commitment to the supplier, and with it high input prices, allowing ...
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作者：Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Moeller, Marc
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bern
摘要：We use a mechanism-design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade-off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first-best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second...
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作者：Newberry, Peter W.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This article provides an empirical examination of observational learning. Using data from an online market for music, I find that observational learning benefits consumers, producers of high-quality music, and the online platform. I also study the role of pricing as a friction to the learning process by comparing outcomes under demand-based pricing to counterfactual pricing schemes. I find that employing a fixed price (the industry standard) can hamper learning by reducing the incentive to exp...
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作者：Fox, Jeremy T.; Gandhi, Amit
作者单位：Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We show how to nonparametrically identify the distribution of unobservables, such as random coefficients, that characterizes the heterogeneity among consumers in multinomial choice models. We provide general identification conditions for a class of nonlinear models and then verify these conditions using the primitives of the multinomial choice model. We require that the distribution of unobservables lie in the class of all distributions with finite support, which under our most general assumpt...
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作者：Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We compare two commonly used mechanisms in public procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a general characterization of both mechanisms based on public scrutiny requirements and showcontrary to conventional wisdomthat an intransparent negotiation always yields higher social surplus than a transparen...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Ciliberto, Federico; Liaukonyte, Jura; Renault, Regis
作者单位：University of Virginia; Cornell University; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We derive equilibrium incentives to use comparative advertising that pushes up own brand perception and pulls down the brand image of targeted rivals. Data on content and spending for all TV advertisements in Over-The- Counter (OTC) analgesics enable us to construct matrices of rival targeting expenditures and estimate the structural model. Using brands' optimal choices, these attack matrices identify diversion ratios, from which we derive comparative advertising damage measures. We find that ...
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作者：Branstetter, Lee; Chatterjee, Chirantan; Higgins, Matthew J.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This article estimates welfare effects of accelerated generic entry via Paragraph IV challenges. Using data from 2000-2008 for hypertension drugs in the United States, we estimate demand using a random-coefficients logit model. We find consumers gain $42 billion whereas producers lose $32.5 billion from entry. This modest $9.5 billion gain in social welfare is consistent with our observation that overall consumption does not increase after entrygeneric sales displace branded sales, shifting su...
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作者：Moeller, Marc; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：University of Bern; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：This article offers a tractable model of (oligopolistic) competition in differentiated product markets characterized by individual demand uncertainty. The main result shows that, in equilibrium, firms offer advance purchase discounts and that these discounts are larger than in the monopolistic benchmark. Competition reduces welfare by increasing the fraction of consumers who purchase in advance, that is, without (full) knowledge of their preferences.
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作者：Cabral, Luis; Natividad, Gabriel
作者单位：New York University; Universidad de Piura
摘要：We identify significant cross-selling effects in the home video industry: a 10% increase in the demand for a studio's old titles leads to a 4.7% increase in new title sales. We argue this is due to supply-side effects: studios with strong titles are better able to push other titles through retailers; and the latter push these additional supplies to consumers by means of lower prices and/or heavier advertising. Our strategy for identifying causality is based on star power effects: increases in ...
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作者：Huck, Steffen; Luenser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed. Although oligopolies benefit consumers regardless of whether prices are fixed or endogenously chosen, we find that price competition lowers efficiency as consumers pay too little attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to rec...
