Information acquisition, referral, and organization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grassi, Simona; Ma, Ching-to Albert
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne; Boston University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12160
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 935-960
• 关键词: Vertical Integration; specialization; COMPETITION; CONTRACTS; ECONOMICS; collusion; QUALITY; search; DESIGN; FIRMS

摘要

Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work effort because of the lack of cost responsibility.