Procurement with specialized firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boone, Jan; Schottmuller, Christoph
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12143
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 661-687
• 关键词: countervailing incentives; multidimensional auctions; DESIGN

摘要

We analyze optimal procurement mechanisms when firms are specialized. The procurement agency has incomplete information concerning the firms' cost functions and values high quality as well as low price. Lower type firms are cheaper (more expensive) than higher type firms when providing low (high) quality. With specialized firms, distortion is limited and a mass of types earns zero profits. The optimal mechanism can be inefficient: types providing lower second-best welfare win against types providing higher second-best welfare. As standard scoring rule auctions cannot always implement the optimal mechanism, we introduce a new auction format implementing the optimal mechanism.