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作者：Perrone, Helena
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：When consumers stockpile, static demand models overestimate long-term price responses. This article presents a dynamic model of demand with consumer inventories and proposes a shortcut to estimate the long-run price elasticities without having to solve the dynamic program. Using French data on food purchases, I find elasticities consistent with those that result from the full-blown estimations found in the literature.
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作者：Honka, Elisabeth; Hortacsu, Ali; Vitorino, Maria Ana
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：How does advertising influence consumer decisions and market outcomes? We utilize detailed data on consumer shopping behavior and choices over bank accounts to investigate the effects of advertising on the different stages of the shopping process: awareness, consideration, and choice. We formulate a structural model with costly search and endogenous consideration sets, and show that advertising in the U.S. banking industry is primarily a shifter of awareness as opposed to consideration or choi...
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作者：Aydin, Erdal; Kok, Nils; Brounen, Dirk
作者单位：Maastricht University; Tilburg University
摘要：This article investigates the rebound effect in residential heating, using a sample of 563,000 households in the Netherlands. Using instrumental variable and fixed-effects approaches, we address potential endogeneity concerns. The results show a rebound effect of 26.7% among homeowners, and 41.3% among tenants. We corroborate the findings through a quasiexperimental analysis, using a large retrofit subsidy program. We also document significant heterogeneity in the rebound effect, determined by...
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作者：Jullien, Bruno; Pouyet, Jerome; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A seller has private information on the future gains from trade with a buyer, but the buyer has the option to invest to produce the good internally. Both the buyer and the seller can efficiently trade ex post under complete information. Despite the lack of information, the buyer sometimes gains by making an early contract offer to the seller. The early contract divides the different types of sellers according to their information, which renders the threat of producing the good in-house credibl...
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作者：Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位：University of Bayreuth; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：For the procurement of complex goods, the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, scoring auctions implement the efficient allocation. If this is not feasible, the buyer must choose between a price-only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition). Bilateral negotia...
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作者：Lee, Robin S.; Schwarz, Michael
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes classic one-to-one matching models by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion and prove that unemployment is minimized with pe...
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作者：Lewis, Matthew S.; Pflum, Kevin E.
作者单位：Clemson University
摘要：Analyses of hospital mergers typically focus on acquisitions that alter local market concentration. However, as prices are negotiated between hospital systems and insurers, this focus may overlook the impact of cross-market interdependence in the bargaining outcome. Using data on out-of-market acquisitions occurring across the United States from 2000-2010, we investigate the impact of cross-market dependencies on negotiated prices. We find that prices at hospitals acquired by out-of-market sys...
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作者：Song, Minjae; Nicholson, Sean; Lucarelli, Claudio
作者单位：Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：Pharmaceutical cocktails often consist of two or more drugs produced by competing firms. The component drugs are often also sold as stand-alone products. We analyze the effects of a merger between two pharmaceutical firms selling complements for colorectal cancer treatment. In this setting there are two merger effects: the standard upward pricing pressure due to firms internalizing the substitution between the stand-alone products, and an additional effect where the firms internalize the impac...
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作者：Dye, Ronald A.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study a seller of an asset who is liable for damages if the seller fails to disclose to buyers an estimate of the asset's value he knew prior to the sale. Our results include as either the damages multiplier that determines the size of the damages the seller must pay buyers increases, or as the probability the seller is caught withholding his estimate from buyers increases, the seller discloses his estimate less often, and as the precision of the seller's estimate increases, he sells a larg...
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作者：Foros, Oystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Rochester
摘要：The agency model used by Apple and other digital platforms delegates retail-pricing decisions to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. Given competition both upstream and downstream, we consider how, under the agency model, retail prices depend on the firms' revenue-sharing splits and the degrees to which consumers view the platforms and the goods sold on the platforms to be substitutes. We show that the agency model may not be universally adopted even if adoption...
