作者：Katona, Zsolt; Knee, Jonathan A.; Sarvary, Miklos
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University
摘要：This article studies competition in contests with a focus on the news industry that is increasingly influenced by social media. The model assumes publishers to pick a single topic from a large pool based on the topics' prior success probabilities, thereby chasing potentially successful topics. Firms that publish topics that become successful divide a reward which can change with the number of competing firms and the number of successful topics. The results show that share structures can be cat...
作者：Basso, Leonardo J.; Figueroa, Nicolas; Vasquez, Jorge
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Bank of Canada
摘要：We compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs: fixing either the price or quantity. For each instrument, we consider sophisticated (screening) and simple (bunching) mechanisms. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance. With unknown demand and increasing marginal costs, the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity, whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal ...
