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作者：Bevia, Carmen; Corchon, Luis C.; Yasuda, Yosuke
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Osaka
摘要：We model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. For some parameter values, the Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm, eventually, will exit the market with probability one. Producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration, because the outcome that maximizes joint profits ...
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作者：Pinkovskiy, Maxim L.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：The health spending slowdown associated with the managed care revolution in the 1990s suggests that managed care may have been successful in controlling health care spending. I exploit the passage of state regulation during the managed care backlash as well as geographic variation in managed care intensity to measure the impact of managed care on spending. I find that restricting managed care causes a large and significant increase in hospital spending, which cannot be explained by changes in ...
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作者：Gilo, David; Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We characterize collusion involving secret vertical contracts between retailers and their supplier-who are all equally patient (vertical collusion). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. Furthermore, vertical collusion can solve the supplier's inability to commit to charging the monopoly wholesale price when retailers are differentiated. The supplier pays retailers slotting allowances as a prize for adhering to the collusive scheme and rejects contract dev...
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作者：Hua, Xinyu; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A firm sells a dangerous product to heterogeneous consumers. Higher consumer types suffer accidents more often but may enjoy higher gross benefits. The firm invests resources to reduce the frequency of accidents. When the consumer's net benefit function (gross benefits minus expected harms) is decreasing in consumer type, the firm contractually accepts liability for accident losses and invests efficiently. When the consumer's net benefit function is increasing in consumer type, the firm contra...
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作者：de Roos, Nicolas; Smirnov, Vladimir
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：We develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion. Dispersion clouds consumer price awareness, encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices. Our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales. Patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price. For less patient firms, monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales. The most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble Edgeworth cycles. Low consumer attentiveness enh...
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作者：Kuhn, Jeffrey; Younge, Kenneth; Marco, Alan
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：Many studies rely on patent citations to measure intellectual heritage and impact. In this article, we show that the nature of patent citations has changed dramatically in recent years. Today, a small minority of patent applications are generating a large majority of patent citations, and the mean technological similarity between citing and cited patents has fallen considerably. We replicate several well-known studies in industrial organization and innovation economics and demonstrate how gene...
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作者：Halaburda, Hanna; Jullien, Bruno; Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：New York University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes focal in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for patient platforms; with an infinite time horizon...
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作者：Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu
作者单位：Lancaster University; University of Graz
摘要：We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high- and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.
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作者：Wang, Chengsi; Wright, Julian
作者单位：Monash University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing t...
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作者：Inderst, Roman; Obradovits, Martin
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Innsbruck
摘要：In various countries, competition laws restrict retailers' freedom to sell their products below cost. A common rationale, shared by policymakers, consumer interest groups and brand manufacturers alike, is that such loss leading of products would ultimately lead to a race-to-the-bottom in product quality. Building on Varian's (1980) model of sales, we provide a foundation for this critique, though only when consumers are salient thinkers, putting too much weight on certain product attributes. B...
