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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London
摘要：Nonretail platforms enable users to engage in noncommercial activities, while generating user information that helps ad targeting. We present a model in which the platform chooses a personalized ad-display rule and an advertising fee (which depends on the targeted user group). The policy that maximizes the platform's advertising revenues creates an incentive for advertisers to strategize targeting. We provide a condition for incentive-compatibility of the first-best policy, and highlight the f...
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作者：Salz, Tobias; Vespa, Emanuel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behavior was collusive, however, the assumption would be violated and one would mispredict counterfactuals. The laboratory allows us to compare predicted behavior to true counterfactuals implemented as t...
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作者：Lee, Jungho
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：I estimate a matching model of business-partnership formation to quantify the relative importance of productivity gains, financing gains, and the coordination failure of effort provision (moral hazard) among partners. Productivity gains account for 61% of the gain from the observed partnerships. For partners in the first quartile of the wealth distribution, however, financing accounts for 93% of the gain. The cost of moral hazard corresponds to 42% of the entire gain from partnerships. A loan ...
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作者：Marshall, Guillermo
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimin...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price-cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circums...
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作者：Flynn, Zach
摘要：Economists typically model a plant's productivity as an exogenous characteristic, but the people who run and work at manufacturing plants make choices, at a cost, that affect plant productivity. I develop a method to partially identify the productivity distribution when such choices determine productivity. The method uses a monotone comparative static result I prove in a general economic model. It does not require instruments or timing assumptions. I use the method to study the effect of imple...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Erkal, Nisvan; Piccinin, Daniel
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Melbourne
摘要：We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long-run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market ...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：The canonical moral hazard model is extended to allow the agent to face endogenous and noncontractible uncertainty. The agent works for the principal and simultaneously pursues outside rewards. The contract offered by the principal thus manipulates the agent's work-life balance. The participation constraint is slack whenever it is optimal to distort the agent's work-life balance away from life compared to a symmetric-information benchmark. Then, the agent's expected utility is high and he face...
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作者：Hefti, Andreas; Liu, Shuo
作者单位：Zurich University of Applied Sciences; University of Zurich; Peking University
摘要：We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherw...
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作者：Kireyev, Pavel
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：I develop an empirical model of idea generation contests with heterogeneous participants and endogenous entry, fit the model to data from a platform used by major advertisers, and simulate counterfactual contest designs. The empirical model resolves ambiguous predictions yielded by contest theory about the effects of different prize structures on contest outcomes. Simulations reveal the impact of strategies that hold fixed total award and balance competition by handicapping advantaged particip...
