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作者：Chen, Yuyu; Igami, Mitsuru; Sawada, Masayuki; Xiao, Mo
作者单位：Peking University; Yale University; Hitotsubashi University; University of Arizona
摘要：We study how ownership affects productivity in the context of China's privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Its true impact remains unclear and controversial, partly because the government selectively privatized or liquidated nonperforming SOEs. To address this selection problem, we augment the Gandhi-Navarro-Rivers nonparametric production function to incorporate endogenous ownership changes. Results suggest private firms are 53% more productive than SOEs on average, but the benefi...
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作者：Donna, Javier D.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：I develop a structural model of urban travel to estimate long-run gasoline price elasticities. I model the demand for transportation services using a dynamic discrete-choice model with switching costs and estimate it using a panel dataset with public market-level data on automobile and public transit use in Chicago. Long-run own- (automobile) and cross- (transit) price elasticities are substantially more elastic than short-run elasticities. Elasticity estimates from static and myopic models ar...
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作者：Celik, Gorkem; Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：ESSEC Business School; Santa Clara University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovisi...
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作者：Macher, Jeffrey T.; Miller, Nathan H.; Osborne, Matthew
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga
摘要：We examine the adoption of fuel-efficient precalciner kilns in the cement industry using the universe of adoption decisions in the United States over 1973-2013. We find that cement plants are more likely to adopt the technology if fuel costs are high, nearby competitors are few, and local demand conditions are favorable. We relate the findings to the Schumpeterian and induced innovation hypotheses regarding the effects of competition and factor prices. Our results suggest firms may be most res...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：I study a model of competition between data intermediaries, which collect personal data from consumers and sell them to downstream firms. Competition has a limited impact on benefiting consumers: If intermediaries offer high compensation for data, consumers share data with multiple intermediaries, which lowers the downstream price of data and hurts intermediaries. Anticipating this, intermediaries offer low compensation for data. Although consumers are exclusive suppliers of data, the nonrival...
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作者：Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Ropero, Eva; Villa, Alessandro T.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; European University of Madrid; Duke University
摘要：We consider the design of the optimal dynamic policy for a firm subject to moral hazard problems. With respect to the existing literature we enrich the model by introducing durable capital with partial irreversibility, which makes the size of the firm a state variable. This allows us to analyze the role of firm's size, separately from age and financial structure. We show that a higher level of capital decreases the probability of liquidation and increases the future size of the firm. Although ...
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作者：Conlon, Christopher; Mortimer, Julie Holland
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：The diversion ratio for products j and k is the fraction of consumers who leave product j after a price increase and switch to product k. Theoretically, it is expressed as the ratio of demand derivatives from a multi-product firm's Bertrand-Nash first-order condition. In practice, diversion ratios are also measured from second-choice data or customer-switching surveys. We establish a LATE interpretation of diversion ratios, and show how diversion ratios are obtained from different intervention...
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作者：Auster, Sarah; Kos, Nenad; Piccolo, Salvatore
作者单位：University of Bonn; Bocconi University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Bocconi University; University of Bergamo
摘要：A buyer can either buy a good at a local monopolist or search for it in the market. The more intensely the buyer searches, the more likely he will find the good in the market; if his search fails, he can still buy it from the local monopolist. We show that a buyer with a higher willingness to pay searches (weakly) more intensely. This skews the distribution of types buying at the local monopolist toward lower valuations and exerts pressure on the local monopolist to reduce his price. Despite t...
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作者：Asker, John; Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being nonrivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption-that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalit...
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作者：Bonnie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
作者单位：IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This article investigates the strategies of a data broker selling information to one or to two competing firms. The data broker combines segments of the consumer demand that allow firms to third-degree price discriminate consumers. We show that the data broker (1) sells information on consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) keeps consumers with low willingness to pay unidentified. The data broker strategically chooses to withhold information on consumer demand to soften competition ...
