Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Asker, John; Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12387
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 662-690
• 关键词: Mechanism design; collusion; 2nd-price

摘要

Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being nonrivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption-that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multilicense auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments.