-
作者：Cox, Christian
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and f...
-
作者：Righi, Cesare; Simcoe, Timothy
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Continuations allow inventors to add new claims to old patents, leading to concerns about unintended infringement and holdup. We study how continuations are used in standard essential patent (SEP) prosecution. Difference in differences estimates suggest that continuation filings increase by 80%-121% after a standard is published. This effect is larger for applicants with licensing-based business models and for patent examiners with a higher allowance rate. Claim language is more similar for SE...
-
作者：Espin-Sanchez, Jose-Antonio; Parra, Alvaro; Wang, Yuzhou
作者单位：Yale University; University of British Columbia; Amazon.com
摘要：We study equilibria in static entry games with single-dimensional private information. Our framework embeds many models commonly used in applied work, allowing for firm heterogeneity and selective entry. We introduce the notion of strength, which summarizes a firm's ability to endure competition. In environments of applied interest, an equilibrium in which entry strategies are ordered according to the firms' strengths always exists. We call this equilibrium herculean. We derive simple and test...
-
作者：Palikot, Emil; Pietola, Matias
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Pay-for-delay patent settlements, in which the incumbent patentee pays a potential entrant to withdraw a patent challenge and stay out of the market, cost patients and taxpayers billions of dollars in higher pharmaceutical prices. We show that in markets with one incumbent and several entrants, the possibility of conditioning such settlements on litigation outcomes against other entrants results in the exclusion of all entrants from the market. When conditional contracts are infeasible, the in...
-
作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Frank, Jeff; Koch, Alexander K.; Valente, Marieta
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Aarhus University; Universidade do Minho
摘要：Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow second-chance offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default wi...
